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Exemptions and/or concessions for the small scale sector have
been an integral feature of India’s tax system for over five decades. In
order to undo the setback suffered during the British colonial rule by
craftsmen and rural artisans who constituted the backbone of India’s
traditional industry, one of the first tasks for policymakers of independent
India was to help village and small industries (SSI) to stand on their own
feet once again. The rationale for protection to the small scale sector,
first articulated in the Industrial Policy Statement, 1948 got embedded in
the industrial policy framework of the government in the fifties, with an
explicit statement in the Industrial Policy Resolution, 1956 saying “….the
aim of state policy will be to ensure that the decentralised sectors
acquire sufficient vitality to be self-supporting”.  Considerations that
drove this policy primarily were promotion of employment and wide
dispersal of industrial growth avoiding urban congestion as also the
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Gandhian ideology of self supporting village economy. The policy was
implemented through various measures of support to small scale
industries during the Second Plan period and onward.  Concessional tax
treatment played a prominent role in this endeavour. 
In addition to tax concessions, the SSIs were protected with a
policy of reservation over a wide range of products to the exclusion of
large scale producers.  SSIs, it was felt, needed support from
government to neutralise their handicap in facing competition from the
large scale producers, such as, lack of easy access to credit and high
cost of borrowing, constraints in marketing, lack of access to information,
and so on.  Support was given also in various other forms such as
concessional credit, capital subsidy, rebate on sale of products,
purchase preference in government procurement, and so on.  In view of
their potential for generating employment and developing rural economy,
there was consensus in favour of such support.
Even so, the policy of protection to SSIs through reservation and
tax concession has come in for criticism from time to time from observers
of India’s economic performance and progress.  Studies carried out by
several eminent economists have concluded that the policy of protecting
small scale sector with ‘reservation’ over a wide range of industrial
products (running to over 800 items at one stage), and fiscal support like
tax concessions have not been beneficial either for the economy or even
for the small scale sector.  Many are of the opinion that the policy of
protection to SSIs at the cost of large units has been a major factor
responsible for the poor growth of Indian economy during the 60s and
70s.
1  While the policy may have helped to generate or sustain
employment in the unorganised sector, such employment was provided
at low levels of income and thus contributed to the persistence of poverty
across the country.   The design of protection provided through
preferential treatment in taxation has also been a subject of criticism as a
factor inhibiting the growth of SSI units as they serve as a disincentive to
grow beyond the level upto which the concessions are available.
Several official committees have also reviewed the schemes of
exemption/concession and some of them have been highly critical of the
regime of tax  concessions and/or their design.
2  The schemes have
undergone changes almost continuously ever since they have been in
operation. Yet, critics have remained skeptical as to whether their
benefits have been worth the cost to the society.5
Persistent criticism and more importantly, economic liberalisation
initiated in the early nineties led to rethinking on the policy of small scale
protection.  With the opening up of the Indian economy, reservation of
certain products for the small scale sector to the exclusion of domestic
large producers became untenable.
3  Hence, the ambit of reservation for
SSIs has been progressively reduced.  Some, however, still remain
4 as
also many of the other benefits extended by the government.  As just
mentioned, the tax concessions also have undergone many changes.
For instance, the tax holiday for SSIs in income tax has been phased
out, while the concessions in excise duty continue, though in a different
form than in the past. Given their deleterious effect on revenues, it is
time the concessions were subjected to a more rigorous cost-benefit
analysis than has been undertaken so far.
Reforms in the structure of central excise, which transformed a
cascading type tax on manufacturing into a manufacturers value added
tax (VAT), too call for a review of the policy for SSI exemptions. The
provision for credit for input taxes, both in the form of excise and service
tax, reduces the gains from exemption, especially for units manufacturing
intermediate goods. This, however, does not find reflection in
assessments of cost-benefit of excise concessions in the economic
environment that small scale units now function in. 
Though it may sound surprising, the revenue cost of the
concessions remains unknown.  Going by the share of the small scale
sector in the economy, it would be fair to say that prima facie, these
concessions cost the exchequer dearly.  As mentioned above, except for
some sectoral studies, no rigorous cost benefit analysis of fiscal
concessions to the small scale sector as a whole seems to have been
carried out.
5  This note attempts a tentative estimate of revenue cost of
the concessions to the small scale sector as they are in operation at
present and seeks to evaluate the arguments for and against their
continuation.  We begin with a brief account of the tax concessions as
they have evolved over the years and then proceed to present an
estimate of their current revenue cost.  This is followed by a review of the
case for and against tax concessions for SSIs.  
The finding, briefly, is that the revenue forgone by the exchequer
in providing concession in excise duties to the small scale sector
(excluding textiles) is of the order of Rs. 14,000 crore a year.
6  The
rationale for this ‘tax expenditure’ is however extremely weak.  While6
there is every reason to assist small scale producers particularly in rural
areas through access to institutional credit and assistance in
technological upgradation and marketing, protection through tax
concession is harmful in many ways and needs to be withdrawn
forthwith.  The exemptions for only tiny and household units may,
however, continue.  Promotional measures like supply of institutional
credit should be reinforced. 
II. Tax Concessions for the Small Scale Sector: Brief
History and Revenue Cost
History
Concessions were provided to the small scale sector in India for
many years in income tax as well as excise duties.  New industrial
undertakings coming under the category of small scale defined in terms
of investment in plant and machinery were allowed tax holiday for a
specified number of years subject to certain conditions, such as location
in rural areas, and so on.  Whereas the income tax holiday was granted
to new undertakings only if they were engaged in producing goods in
what was called the “priority list”, in the case of new small scale
enterprises no such restriction applied.  Such preferential treatment for
small scale units occured in many of the tax benefits extended in income
tax to promote new industries, technological advancement, and
development of backward regions.  However, as mentioned above, these
have largely been withdrawn or are on their way out.
Concessions in excise duties, too, were provided to the small
scale right from the inception of support policy for the small and tiny
sector as a strategy of development and employment promotion.  Excise
concessions provided a potent instrument for influencing the pattern of
production and technological choices in favour of employment intensive
techniques because of the wide coverage of union excises and their
impact on the relative prices of outputs as also inputs.  In order to
promote employment, products of several industries were exempted from
excise if produced without the aid of power.  Items so exempted included
confectionery, food products, vegetable and ‘non-essential’ oils, paper
and paper board, man-made fiber and yarn, footwear, steel furniture,7
bolts, nuts etc. In the case of a few tariff items like cotton fabrics, woollen
fabrics, and man-made fabrics, exemption was available in respect of a
few sub-items only.  In the case of goods brought under taxation in 1975
through tariff item 68 (“goods not elsewhere specified”), full exemption
was allowed if certified by the Khadi and Village Industries Commission
(KVIC) as products of a village unit. Similar concession was extended to
producers of handmade paper and paperboard.  Handicrafts falling under
item 68 were also fully exempted from duty.
  
Differential excise taxation was used also to discourage the use
of machines in certain cases e.g., in the manufacture of biris. Glassware
produced by manually operated press was treated favourably for taxation
as compared to those made with the help of automatic or semi-automatic
press.  The handloom sector of textile industry too enjoyed several
concessions in excise duty.  In addition to these, exemption and/or
concession was granted to the small scale producers of a number of
commodities, using varying criteria (or a combination thereof) based on
scale of clearances, i.e., production for sale and/or size of investment in
plant and machinery and the number of workers.  Under a scheme
introduced in 1978, full exemption was granted in excise duty on a
specified level of clearances of SSIs and thereafter slab-wise
concessions were given in respect of specified items.  For full exemption
from duty the limit fixed was clearances upto Rs. 5 lakh in a given year if
the total clearances in the preceding year did not exceed Rs. 15 lakh.  In
order not to discourage employment of labour beyond a level, under a
scheme introduced in 1977, for manufacturers of tariff item 68 products
(i.e., goods not specified elsewhere) using power, full exemption was
based on twofold criteria in terms of both investment and turnover.  A
general scheme of small scale exemption was introduced in respect of
certain specified items in 1985.  This was replaced in 1986 and
subsequently amended through notifications.
7
In order not to discourage the growth of an SS producer beyond
the limit laid down for entitlement of concession, the ceilings in terms of
clearances were raised from time to time and the scheme of exemption
made simpler.  Under the scheme currently in operation
8, a producer of
specified goods with a clearance of not more than Rs. 4 crore in a given
year, does not have to pay any duty on the first Rs. 1 crore of clearances
in the following year.  ‘Specified goods’ now cover a wide range of
products; only a few are left out.  This concession is however not
available in respect of specified goods bearing a ‘brand name’ of another8
producer, except where the brand is one of KVIC, a state Khadi  and
Village Industry Board, National Small Industries Corporation etc. Until
the year 2005, producers availing exemption could opt for paying duty at
a concessional rate and claim credit for CenVAT paid on inputs.  The
option has since been withdrawn.  However, exemption for specified
goods like ‘essential oils’, perfumes, ceramic goods, locks, if produced
without the aid of power which was granted in 1986
9 continues.  Similarly
goods produced in rural areas continue to be exempt if certified by KVIC
or produced by a registered cooperative society.  Such goods include
preparations of vegetables and fruits, pickles, sauces and ketchups, and
footwear.
10  
Recent years have witnessed a number of measures to simplify
the procedure to be followed by small scale producers in the matter of
compliance with excise laws.  For instance, no registration with the
Directorate of Industry or DCSSI is necessary for availing the SSI excise
exemption.  No declaration is now needed to be filed either with the
central excise authorities so long as the sales of goods (including
completed exempted goods) do not exceed Rs. 50 lakh.  No monthly
return need be filed by a small scale producer unless he is required to
pay duty. Only the 2005 Union Budget has provided that SSI units with
clearances exceeding Rs.40 lakh will file a simple declaration. This
position remains unchanged this year (2006-07).
Revenue Cost of Excise Concessions: An Estimate
Even though largely simplified, the exemption granted to small
scale producers is still substantial and the revenue cost thereof is not so
negligible.  However, an evaluation of the costs and benefits of these
exemptions presents formidable difficulties owing to (i) the acute paucity
of requisite data; and (ii) simultaneous operation of other benefits for the
small scale sector, making it problematic to isolate the influence of one to
the exclusion of others.
 
The revenue cost of tax concessions is not easy to figure out,
primarily for the reason that the data required for such an exercise is not
available.
11  The number of small scale units availing the benefit of
exemption and the total value of their tax exemption clearance is not
known.  As just mentioned, units having less than 1 crore clearance – the
tiny ones – do not have to register with the Central Excise department.
Nor are they required to file any declaration about their production or9
clearance.  It appears that the excise authorities do carry out some
survey from time to time but the figures of tax concessions availed or
worked out therefrom seem to be grossly unrealistic.  The reasons for
such skepticism are set out below along with an alternative measure of
the revenue cost of SSI excise exemption.
According to official estimates
12 the SSI sector accounts for
about 40 percent of GDP from manufacturing in the Indian economy.
‘Industry’ in turn accounts for 29 percent of GDP. Thus, in terms of
contribution to GDP, the share of SSI works out to 40 percent of 29
percent or 11.6 percent. It would however not be correct to take this
proportion of GDP in full as constituting the base for excise taxation.  It is
necessary to exclude the value added of tiny or village units which are
out of the tax net in any case and also the value of products which
necessarily have to be left out of taxation, like, exports. Allowance has
also to be made for the credit for tax on inputs produced by small scale
units which are used by large scale producers and get taxed in the hands
of the latter.
In deriving the taxable base in the SS sector, it is necessary to
derive the value added in the tiny sector comprising khadi and village
industry units and the tiny units of SSI (with fixed investment less than
Rs 25 lakh
13).  This is because these units cannot and should not be
brought under the tax net.  No data on the production of these units are
however, available. Using the figures available for production of khadi
and village industries
14 and the share of tiny units derived from the Third
Census of Small Scale Industries for the year 2001-02, we arrive at a
figure for output of these units – Rs. 7,685 crore in a total production of
Rs. 52,504 crore by SSI units as a whole. While the former is assumed
to represent fully the value added of the SSIs, since tax paid purchases
by KVIC is minimal, the value added by other small scale units may be
arrived at by looking at the ratio of value added to output of the small
scale sector.  This turns out to be 35 percent.
15 With GDP of Rs. 2,082
thousand crore in 2001-02, these work out to 2.9 percent of GDP. The
revised base for excise duty for SSI production thus comes to 8.7
percent of GDP. 
The base so derived has to be adjusted further for the following
components to arrive at the potential base for excise revenue from value
added by small scale producers:10
•  value added in exempt goods
•  value added in goods that are exported
•  value added in products that are used mainly as intermediate
goods.  These need to be excluded as they get taxed at the
subsequent stages.
These three categories tend to overlap.  Corrections are needed
to ensure that double counting does not occur. For this purpose the
following identities are kept in view:
Total value 
added  = value added in exempt goods 
+ value added in non-exempt intermediate goods 
+ value added in non-exempt final use goods, and … (1)
Value of 
exports  = exports of exempt goods 
+ exports of non-exempt intermediate goods 
+ exports of non-exempt final use goods …….(2)
Information in this regard is not available individually for any of
these categories.  The only source of information for the shares of each
of these categories is the Third All India Census of Small Scale
Industries 2001-2002 (final results).
16 The actual figures from this census
are however not used here since the totals presented from this census
do not match even in dimensions the figures reported earlier for this
sector. Exports for instance are recorded at Rs. 14,199 crore in the
census. On the other hand, figures from other sources suggest that SSI
sector contributes about 35 percent of total exports of the country,
constituting 4 percent of GDP.  This translates into about Rs. 75,000
crore for the year 2000-01.
17   According to sample survey for 1999-00,
exports were of the order of Rs. 29,900 crore.  These differences are
attributed to the relatively smaller coverage of the SSI census conducted
by the Small Industries Development Organisation (SIDO).
18  Therefore,
for the aggregates, the figures provided in the Handbook of Industrial
Policy and Statistics, 2002 and further updates from the SIDO website
are used.
19  
It needs to be noted here that the definition of SSI in these
surveys covers units which have investment in plant and machinery of
less than Rs. 1 crore. (Going by the second SSI census, output capital11
ratio on the average is 2, suggesting that the turnover of these units
would be in the range of Rs. 2 crore at the most).   The ratios for the
other categories in the identity 1 above are derived from the tables
provided in the report.  These are reproduced in the table presented
below.





Exempt goods 38% 53.93%
Non-exempt intermediate goods 28.15% 15.04%
Non-exempt final use goods 33.85% 31.04%
Source: Constructed from tables for top 200 products/activities from the 
Third Census for Small Scale Industries
Out of the information available from official sources, exports
from SSI, may be taken to be 35 percent of the total exports of India.
Given that India’s exports are about 12 percent of GDP, the SSI
contribution would thus be about 4 percent of GDP. The SSI census
indicates that the exports by the tiny sector contribute 26.6 percent of the
total SSI exports. The exports by the non-tiny sector therefore can be
taken to be 2.94 percent of GDP. Since non-exempt final use goods
have a share of a little over 31 percent in SSI exports, the exports of
such goods by the non-tiny sector may be put at 0.91 percent of GDP.
Further, applying the ratio of gross value added to value of output of
0.35, value added in exports would be 0.32 percent of GDP. This is to be
excluded from the potential excise tax base.
On the other hand, the contribution of the non-exempt final use
goods to GDP is 2.94 percent. Correcting this figure for exports, the net
taxable component of SSI production comes to about 2.62 percent of
GDP.  Applying the average rate of CENVAT of 16 percent to this base,
the loss of revenue may be assessed at 0.42 percent of GDP. Taking the
estimated GDP figure for 2005-06 at Rs. 3,200.6 thousand crore, the
estimated loss of revenue from excise exemption to SSIs works out to
Rs. 13,442 crore for the last financial year and assuming the same
growth as excise revenue, Rs. 14,282 crore for the current financial year,
2006-07.
20 As already stated, this leaves out the revenue forgone by the
excise concessions in a major segment of Indian industry, viz., textiles.
Besides, the estimate is based on fairly conservative assumptions and
so may be taken as the lower limit of the revenue loss caused by12
concessions for the SSI sector. In any case, it leaves out the revenue
loss suffered by the state governments because of preferential treatment
of the SSI sector in state sales tax (now VAT). Whether this revenue cost
is justified by the benefits to the society, is examined briefly in the section
that follows.
III. The Case for and Against Tax Concessions
for the Small Scale Sector
The Case for
The case for providing tax concession to SSIs rests essentially
on the following arguments:
•  Small scale production is inherently employment intensive. Available
information (ASI and SSI census) shows that as against an
investment requirement of Rs. 4 lakh per unit of labour in the large
scale sector, the investment requirement for one unit of labour in the
small scale is only Rs. 2 lakh.
•  Small scale units suffer from a number of handicaps particularly in
the matter of credit, access to input and output markets which stands
in the way of their competing with large producers.  Institutional
credit is not usually available to small scale units as banks and other
lenders find it difficult and costly to handle numerous small loans.
Banks usually prefer a small number of large borrowers over a large
number of small ones.  Hence the need for state support to provide a
level playing field for the SSIs.
•  Large scale producers have the advantage of economies of scale
and thus enjoy an advantage in the cost of production.  Hence small
scale producers cannot survive without tax protection.  Even where
the manufacturing process is scale-neutral, large producers enjoy
economies in bulk purchases of materials due to discounts allowed
by suppliers, economies in selling costs, and so on, which are not
open to the small scale units. Small scale producers also cannot take13
advantage of superior market strategy available to large producers
owing to their size.  Nor can they operate distribution channels of
their own on account of resource constraints. Limited access to
market information leaves them with little access to the product
markets.  This limits their access to technical information as well, and
thereby impedes upgradation of technology.
•  The only advantage the small scale units enjoy is in the matter of
hiring wage labour.  They can hire labour at a cheaper rate and they
do not need to always observe the restrictions on hiring and firing of
labour.  Small scale units set up in rural areas also have the
advantage of lower cost of factory space, and so on.  Often village
industries operate in households.  However, these advantages are
outweighed by the disadvantages enumerated above.  Hence the
need for concessional tax treatment and support in other forms.
•  The case for maintaining state support to SSI units including excise
exemption is reinforced by citing the dynamism of the SSI sector in
recent years.  The Mid-Term Appraisal of the Tenth Five Year Plan,
while reviewing sectoral progress and prospects observes:  “The
unregistered manufacturing or the small and medium enterprise
(SME) sector has been a dynamic segment of Indian industry and
has proved its competitive ability in recent years” (para 1.29).  The
Indian automobile components sector – an ancillary industry for
automobile manufacturing – has come in for special attention for its
fast growth in the recently published Human Development Report
2005 of the UNDP (p134).  Besides, the contribution of SSI in terms
of employment and exports is cited all the time to advance the case
for support to SSIs.
The Case Against
Despite the arguments advanced above, pleas for tax
concession and reservation are questionable on several counts.  Briefly,
these are:
•  Prior to the reform of excise into a levy based on input tax credit,
there was a cascading levy and therefore exemptions implied
significant differences in terms of prices. Subsequent to the
introduction of MODVAT in 1987 and its reform through the early14
nineties transforming central excise into a manufacturer’s VAT,
cascading within the tax structure has been reduced considerably.
The tax due from any manufacturer now was limited to the
difference between the tax due on the value of clearances net of
input taxes paid. Exemption in this scenario meant that the
manufacturer could not get credit for input taxes and which therefore
become embedded in the price of the good. This would have two
consequences:
1.  Regular registered units who potentially can purchase their
inputs from small scale units, may be reluctant to do so, since
there would be no possibility of input tax credit. 
2.  Exporters, too, may be unwilling to source their goods from
exempt SS units, since the scope for zero-rating gets
considerably curtailed.
These concerns find reflection in the composition of dealers in the
survey of small scale units undertaken by the excise department.
When the law permitted a regime of concessional rates of tax as an
alternative to exemption, where the former allowed for tax credit,
there was a revealed preference for the former. Only 12 percent of
the total clearances of small scale units availed of the exemption
option. But this option has now been made compulsory to the
detriment of the SSIs. In other words, they would stand to gain if
there was no exemption.
•  While there is a strong case for “promotional” measures to support
the small scale sector, protective measures like concessions
extended over a long time turn out to be props for inefficiency in
production and lead to a proliferation of spurious small units to get
the advantage of the protective umbrella.  “Protection to small units
in combination with various statutory regulations on large scale
organised industry, provide perverse incentives to remain small.
Continuous protection thus gives positive disincentive to improve
competitive strength”.
21  A critical evaluation of the small scale
industry policy in India by Rakesh Mohan, published by NCAER in
2001 brings out succinctly the damage caused by the policy of
protection to SSIs even in the matter of employment.  The points
that emerge from Mohan’s study, based on a careful analysis of
available evidence, merit attention. Basically these are:15
•  Preference to SSIs has discouraged large scale industry (LSI)
from specialising in labour intensive products in which India has
a comparative advantage.  This has gone against employment
generation, which is the professed aim of protecting SSIs.
•  Encouragement to SSIs has limited the choice of techniques and
plant size available to Indian producers and thus stunted the
growth and technological advancement of Indian industry.
•  Employment growth in manufacturing sector in India in the 80s
and 90s has been lower than in the countries of south east Asia.
•  Value addition by SSI has been low compared to the LSI.  As a
result, low level manufacturing activities have prolonged low
income employment activities.  “Workers in the non-SSI sector
are on average 2.5 to 3 times as productive as the SSI sectors, 5
to 10 times as DMEs and 5 to 25 times in the NDMEs and
OAEs
22.  These productivity differences between different
schemes of the manufacturing sectors are much higher than that
typically found in other countries”.
23
•  The story of growth of small scale industry put out by SIDO is not
reliable as their data are open to question.  This has been
highlighted in the Abid Hussain Committee Report too.
•  The objective of dispersion of production also has not been
achieved.
•  Impact on exports also has been deleterious, contrary to what is
widely believed. India has not graduated from low technology/low
capital categories of exports to high technology categories at the
same pace as other Asian economies.
•  How the policy of protection to the small scale sector created
problems for India’s industrial development was analysed in a
rigorous framework in the paper by Dipak Mazumdar cited earlier
with the specific example of the textile sector.  The aim of protecting
the household sector (handlooms) the paper observes, “led
inadvertently to the rapid growth of an intermediate technology  the
sector making use of low-grade semi-automatic looms in small units”16
(the powerlooms).  Static cost-benefit analysis showed that private
profitability was highest in the powerloom sector and it would have
developed even without any restrictions on the mills. Much of this
sector’s profitability came from the differential in wage between mills
and the power looms.  In the absence of this differential, social
profitability of the mills, Mazumdar points out, would be much larger
even in a static framework.  When dynamic considerations are
brought in, “the problems boil down to favouring a policy of
increasing employment per unit of output at the cost of doing
damage to the possibility of achieving an increase in output large
enough to outweigh the smaller use of labour per unit of output”.
These observations would apply equally to other products as well.
•  While the SSI sector has shown remarkable dynamism in recent
years, this is attributable largely to the withdrawal of reservations and
exposure to competition. In the automobile ancillaries, the growth
has been attributed in the UNDP report cited earlier to the support
provided through regulation of foreign investors, including local
content obligations (UNDP, ibid, p.134).
•  Data thrown up by the Third SSI Census bring out facts that go
against the claims about higher employment potential of the small
scale sector. When these figures are compared with the figures for
the factory sector, it is increasingly evident that the distinct identity of
the SSI sector on this count is gradually getting blurred. From the
comparison presented below, for improved efficiency in production
as well as employment with reasonable incomes, expanded
production in formal manufacturing sector emerges as a more
appropriate option. It may be pointed out that all these comparisons
refer to the registered SSI sector alone. For instance:
•  The average number of employees per unit has declined from
6.29 to 4.48.
•  Ratio of output to fixed investment has declined from 4.61 to
2.21 signifying a higher capital output ratio in the small scale
sector. The ratio of output to fixed investment for total industry
from the Annual Survey of Industries, 2002-03 is 18.53. 
•  Capital intensities have also increased.  Employment per 1 lakh
of investment has declined from 3.93 to 0.67. Even adjusted for17
inflation, capital intensity in SSI seems to have increased.
Capital labour ratio has gone up by more than 115 percent.
While there were sharp differences in the capital intensity in
1987-88, 0.6 per lakh of investment for the factory sector against
3.93 for the SSI sector, this difference has reduced over time,
the figures for 2000-01 being 0.2 for the factory sector versus
0.67 for the SSI sector. Adjusted for inflation, the ratio for the
factory sector has increased only by 73 percent during the
corresponding period. This reflects the fact that the SSI sector is
sharply losing out its employment edge.
•  Ratio of production to employment has increased from 1.1733
lakh per one unit of labour to 3.299 lakh.  Corrected for inflation
(WPI for manufactured goods) this works out to less than 10
percent increase for the entire period.  If deflated by WPI for all
commodities, virtually no increase in output per employee seems
to have taken place.  To be precise, the increase has been only
0.95 percent over the entire period. In contrast, the
corresponding figure for the ASI sector has increased by 63
percent between 1990-91 and 2000-01 and stands as 11.6 lakh
per employee in 2000-01. 
•  The claim of large employment generation by SSIs needs to be
taken with a lot of caution, especially given the periodic expansion in
threshold in the coverage of SSI sector. First, to quote the Mid-Term
Appraisal again: “The Office of Development Commissioner of Small
Scale Industries under the Ministry of SSI has recently completed the
Third SSI Census (reference year 2001-02).  Employment per SSI
unit has reduced from 6.29 per unit to 4.6 per unit between 1988 (the
reference year for the previous Census) and 2001-02” (para 8.13). It
is not clear how such a change continues to support the argument
for high and unchanging employment potential in this sector.
Second, if one examines the profile of SSI units as per the Third SSI
Census, there is a concentration of employment in the lowest output
firms – 38.7 percent of employment is sustained in units with output
less that Rs. 1 lakh for registered SSI units and 88 percent in the
case of unregistered SSI units. In contrast, the outputs are
concentrated in units with turnover above Rs. 5 crore – 49 percent
for registered SSI sector. Treating this entire sector as one
homogenous unit is therefore not justified either on grounds of
employment generation or on grounds of efficiency. 18
•  Protection of SSIs through tax concessions and reservations,
coupled with purchase preference by the public sector has had a
negative fallout on economy and social welfare, the cost of which
remains unknown.  Protected units did not have the motivation to
ensure quality in their products.  Thus with reservation, many
electrical items and auto parts produced by SSIs turned out to be
substandard.  Their use posed hazards for safety.  It is only with
dereservation, that is, when faced with  competitors, that the
automobile ancillary industry has emerged competitive in the world
market.  Protection through excise concession like reservation goes
against efficiency. So far as we could gather, the automobile
ancillary industry now consists of relatively large producers
supported by large automobile manufacturers.
•  Viewed in the light of the facts and arguments put forward above, the
recent recommendations of the Task Force on Drugs
24 for raising the
ceiling on clearances entitled to excise exemptions in the case of SSI
drug manufacturers from Rs. 1 crore to Rs 5 crore cannot but be
regarded as ill-advised. The contention in favour of the
recommendation seems to be that it is only the small manufacturers
who produce drugs at prices affordable by the common man. If that
is the case, one may ask, is excise concession called for? If on the
other hand, small scale manufacturers cannot survive without tax
concessions, then such concessions clearly turn out to be a prop for
inefficiency. Among the considerations which seem to have prevailed
with the committee to recommend a higher scale of excise
concession for drug manufacturers, especially small scale
manufacturers, are:
(i) Excise is levied on the basis of MRP
25, with rather inadequate
abatement for trade margins.
(ii) They are facing competition from new units located in zero-tax
areas, like Himachal Pradesh, Uttaranchal, Jammu & Kashmir.
The right remedy for these problems is an appropriate level of
abatement for trade margins, as recommended by the committee for
drugs in general, irrespective of whether they are manufactured by large
or small producers. As for unfair competition from units operating from
zero-tax territories, there is a clear case for withdrawal of tax holidays by
region, as they distort location choices of the producers. Neither of the19
considerations mentioned by the committee therefore provide a valid
ground for expanding the excise concessions for small units.
An additional argument against excise concession to small scale
drug manufacturers is that the really small or tiny units may not find it
possible to institute any rigorous quality control measures, or observe the
requirements of Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) as prescribed for
drug manufacturers. Observance of GMP requires minimum scale of
operation. To enable small scale units to achieve this scale, the
requirements are, easy access to institutional credit, dissemination of
information regarding technology and a more efficient regulator for the
sector.
26 The focus should be for assistance in these directions, rather
than on tax concessions, which blunt the incentives for efficiency.
•  Another consideration that goes against exemption to any sector in
excise is the break in the VAT chain that results from such
concessions.  It provides an opportunity for SSI units to use the
CenVAT paid by them on their purchase by selling them to units who
can make use of the invoice, thereby creating a market for invoices.
•  Whatever be the ceiling for eligibility for exemption, the SSIs would
always have an incentive not to exceed the ceiling at least on paper.
Thus given a ceiling at any level, there will always be strong
incentive for under-reporting by units that grow fast, leading to
evasion of other taxes as well.
The plea for expanding the ambit of excise exemption by raising
the level of clearances for qualifying for the benefit, as often put forward
to enable the SSIs to grow, ignores the fact that ‘small scale’ is not a
homogenous sector. A high ceiling puts the tiny village and cottage
industries at a disadvantage whereas it is the latter that are most labour-
intensive.  There can therefore be a case for assisting the tiny and
cottage units only.  However, what these units need most is institutional
credit on reasonable terms, raw material at reasonable prices, and
market access.  In the absence of help in this regard, tax concessions go
more to the benefit of those who supply capital to village producers and
in many industries with products which are sold at high prices, a sizeable
chunk of the benefits may be appropriated by traders/middlemen.  It is
worth recalling what the Dandekar Committee said in the context.  To
quote: “These (village and cottage) industries being unorganised are at
present in the clutches of merchant capital.  Unless this is replaced by a20
non exploitative institutional infrastructure, the policy to protect and
promote employment in the industries, while it may promote low
productivity and low paid employment, also helps perpetuate exploitation
by merchant capital through the trader-money-lender nexus it creates.”
Sad to say, the situation does not seem to have changed materially even
after twenty-five years since these observations were made.  Nothing
brings this home more poignantly than the suicides by farmers because
of their debt burden to village money lenders.
IV. Conclusion and Recommendations
The negative consequences of protection and exemption based
on specified levels of production clearly outweigh the points advanced in
their favour.  Clearly, the policy of protection has outlived its utility.  It is
worth noting that the case for protection through tax concession put
forward in policy documents in the past invariably mentioned that such
protection should be given only for a limited period.  Mahalanobis, the
intellectual father of the Second Five Year Plan that assigned a special
role for the small scale sector, had advocated a 'transition phase'  in
which preference would be given to the so called ‘small-scale and
household industries’ and visualised the need for such preference to
decrease over time. It was envisaged that eventually “a gradual and
steady change-over would be made to move to efficient forms of
production by the increasing use of machinery driven by power.”
27  It is a
pity that the ‘transition’ has not ended even after fifty years.
The arguments for extension of small scale exemption and
expansion of their ambit periodically emanate mostly from the lobby of
what may be called the “modern small scale industry”. These are the
industries that are most dynamic.  The main advantage in this case is the
low wages they pay and gains from operating in the unorganised sector.
The dynamism now displayed by them owes more to dereservation than
to tax concessions. Hence, as the Mid Term Appraisal of the Tenth Plan
emphasises, dereservation should be accelerated and this seems to be
happening. Excise concessions under these circumstances are
redundant. 21
Indeed it is time the policy for protection to SSIs through
reservation and tax concessions was ended. For administrative reasons
alone, tiny and village units may be kept out of the purview of excise
taxation. This can be secured by granting exemption to units with
clearances of no more than Rs. 50 lakh. To elaborate, units with
clearances of upto Rs. 50 lakh in the previous year would continue to be
exempt in the current year. In the eventuality of exceeding Rs. 50 lakh in
clearances in the current year, tax would become payable on all
clearances beyond Rs. 50 lakh. In subsequent years, such a dealer
would become a regular tax-paying dealer.
28 All other units should be
fully taxed with the benefit of credit for tax paid on inputs. It may be
pointed out that as per the Third SSI census, the proportion of units with
turnover more than Rs. 50 lakh is a mere 3.6 percent of registered SSI
units and only 0.08 percent of unregistered SSI units. They account for
over 78 percent of output and only 22 percent of employment in the
registered SSI sector. In unregistered SSI sector, this segment accounts
for 0.4 percent of total employment and 22 percent of gross output.
Clearly, the bulk of the small and tiny units within this sector would be left
completely unaffected by the proposed threshold, thereby also protecting
the employment generation in the sector. 
The limit of Rs. 50 lakh should be applied with no exemptions or
exclusions from the base. This would be in sharp contrast to the
provisions at present, whereby, in computing Rs. 1 crore for exemption in
the current year or Rs. 4 crore in the previous year for eligibility, a
number of exclusions are allowed.
29 Lowering the threshold to Rs. 50
lakh is being proposed to keep the focus firmly on the size of the unit and
not on the nature of transactions undertaken/goods produced. 
It may be pointed out that this recommendation accords also with
that of the Kelkar Task Force on Indirect Taxation (2002) on reducing the
level of excise exemption. It is also pertinent to note that all dealers
(including village producers) having turnover of more than Rs. 10 lakh a
year are liable to pay VAT in their respective states.
30 With a turnover of
Rs. 50 lakh, any given unit is expected to generate value added to the
tune of Rs. 17 lakh,
31 of which net income should easily cross Rs. 1 lakh.
Since the income tax threshold for exemption is currently Rs. 1 lakh,
there is a consonance with the proposed threshold in excise.
Two further arguments for such a radical departure from the
existing provisions are:22
(i.)  The present regime creates a complicated set of
provisions, with exemptions within exclusions, providing
scope and incentive for considerable efforts on tax
planning alone, besides complexity in tax administration.
(ii.)  The CenVAT tax credit mechanism allows credit for input
taxes and thereby eliminates the need for providing
specific exemptions, more so in the case of units
producing intermediate goods. With provisions for
availing credit not only for CenVAT but also for service
tax, we now have a timely window of opportunity to clean
up the jungle of elaborate provisions to ease the tax
burden on specific sets of producers. All such initiatives
were undertaken during the pre-CenVAT regime with
cascading taxes. 
  Measures to help the SSI sector should focus on promotional
measures, particularly making institutional credit available on reasonable
terms. The recent initiative to have credit rating for SMEs, to enable them
to have access to formal sector credit is thus to be welcomed. ‘Micro-
finance’ seems to have transformed the rural development scene in
Bangladesh dramatically. There is need to explore the scope of micro-
finance in India, too. Further, rather than emphasising the dichotomy
between the small and large scale sectors, it would be worthwhile to
promote the synergies and interdependence between the two sectors,
through,  inter alia, higher downstream integration. Our policy should
strengthen such initiatives to facilitate the small scale sector rather than
continue with the irrational and harmful practice of providing tax breaks. 26
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Endnotes
                                                          
1   An incisive critique of the policy is provided in a working paper of the Centre
for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, published in 1997
(“Policy on Modern Small Scale Industries: A Case of Government Failure”) by
Suresh Tendulkar and T.A. Bhavani.  A paper written for a conference in
Helsinki, by Dipak Mazumdar in 1988 articulated a scathing criticism of India’s
small scale policy. (“Import Substituting Industrialisation: The Indian Experience
in the Textile Industry”, EDI Word Bank). A more recent critique is contained in
an NCAER publication of 2001 (Small Scale Industry Policy in India: A Critical
Evaluation) by Rakesh Mohan.
2  The Committee on Tax Measures to Promote Employment (or Dandekar
Committee) of 1980 was particularly critical about several aspects of the
protection policy for the small scale sector.  Other committees that took a look at
their tax treatment of SSIs are the Committee on Indirect Taxation of 1976
headed by L.K. Jha, the Nayak Committee (1992), Abid Hussain Committee
(1997) and the S.P. Gupta Committee (2001), to name the notable ones.  Only
the S.P. Gupta Committee seemed to be in favour of continuing and even
widening the scope of  tax concessions.
3  The removal of QRs implied that goods reserved for SSI could be imported into
the country but not produced by domestic large scale units.
4  As of March 2005, 506 items continue to be on the reserved list. The Union
Budget for 2006-07 announced some further pruning of this list – 180 items have
been identified for dereservation.
5 The Dandekar Committee had attempted to quantify the revenue cost of
concessions to the small scale sector in textiles, and a few other products viz.,
matches, leather, soap and agricultural machinery. These estimates are now
dated. Besides, no global or overall estimate of the revenue cost was attempted.
6 ‘Textiles’ are left out of the purview of this paper as they fall under a separate
excise regime and are not incorporated under  SSI exemption scheme.
7 The history recounted here is based partly on the Report of the Dandekar
Committee and also information available on SIDO online.
8 Formulated in notification nos. 8 /2003 & 9/2003 – CE as amended in 2004 and
2005.
9  Under notification no. 167/86-CenVAT.
10 These exemptions are provided under notification no. 88/88 as amended from
time to time.
11 Paucity of data on SSIs has been a subject of persistent complaint by analysts
and almost all official panels.  To quote the Dandekar Committee Report of 1980,
“The costs and benefits of prevailing differential excise duties and direct
assistance through sale rebates and interest subsidies given to the labour-
intensive sector have not been systematically examined.  Unfortunately, relevant
data are also wanting.  We would like to underscore the paucity of even basic
information relevant for decision-making in the first instance and its evaluation24
                                                                                                                                 
subsequently.  How serious this lacuna is can be judged by reading our studies
of a few selected industries.” (para 8.28) Data availability does not seem to have
improved much since then, as may be seen from the Report of the Abid Hussain
Committee and the Study by Rakesh Mohan (op. cit.).
12 Vide Report of the Study Group on Development of Small Scale Industries,
Planning Commission, 2001.
13  This is the definition used in the SSI policy documents.
14 ref.: table 57, Handbook of Industrial Policy and Statistics, 2002, Ministry of
Commerce and Industry, Government of India.
15 This is derived from the 1999-2000 sample survey for small scale industries.
Similar figures are not available for the third census. (ref.: table 42, Handbook of
Industrial Policy and Statistics, 2002, Ministry of Commerce and Industry,
Government of India.)
16 The report provides information on production as well as exports for the top
200 commodities/ activities. These cover 54 percent of total production of the
sampled firms and 88 percent of total exports. This data is used to derive the
decomposition discussed above. It is assumed that the decomposition within the
top 200 commodities/activities would apply to the entire sector as well.
http://www.smallindustryindia.com/publications/books/fcensus.htm
17 A similar figure is reported in table 54 in Handbook of Industrial Policy and
Statistics, 2002.
18 Abid Hussain Committee Report (1997) identifies the problems with the various
data sources on SSI units. In particular, it is highlighted that the SIDO census
has an incomplete coverage.
19 http://www.smallindustryindia.com/ssiindia/statistics/economic.htm
20 The statement of  “Tax Expenditures under the Central Tax System” presented
by the Finance Minister, as a part of the Union Budget 2006-07, provides an
estimate of Rs. 12,560 crore based on an earlier version of this paper. The
figures presented here are revised numbers taking into account more recent
GDP numbers.
21 Tendulkar and Bhavani, ibid.
22 ‘DME’ stands for Directory Manufacturing Establishments which had six
employees of whom at least one was hired.  ‘NDME’ stands for Non-Directory
Manufacturing Establishments which had five or less employees of whom at least
one was hired.  ‘OAE’ stands for Own-Account Enterprises.
23 Rakesh Mohan ibid., p.95
24 Report of the Task Force to Explore Options other than Price Control for
Achieving the Objective of Making Available Life-saving Drugs at Reasonable
Prices, September 20, 2005.
25 The change from excise based on ex-factory price to that based on 60 percent
of MRP was effected through a notification of  January 7, 2005.
26 In the absence of such a regulator or auditor  and it would be  unrealistic to
except such monitoring to be effective over small units across the country 
encouraging small scale units to come up in drugs is likely to lead to proliferation25
                                                                                                                                 
of substandard drugs which many a time results from procurement by state
agencies from local small scale units. This apprehension is articulated in an
editorial in the Business Standard  of September 23, 2005 in following words:
“The Indian public machinery simply does not have the competence to manage a
price control-cum-procurement system which will bring down drug prices even
further, particularly when there is a need to stay away from substandard drugs.”
27 Quoted in Tendulkar and Bhavani, op cit. Dandekar Committee also had said,
“It is generally recognised that enhancing employment by adoption of labour
intensive technology can only be a temporary and transitional solution to the
problem of unemployment .” (para 8.22)
28 Reverting from tax paying to an exempt status can be allowed if clearances in
two consecutive years fall short of Rs. 50 lakh.
29 Exemptions so allowed include value of exports, ineligible branded output, and
exempt items.
30 Since state VAT allows for some deductions in computing the limit of Rs. 10
lakh, a higher threshold without such deductions should be acceptable. It may be
noted that some states require manufacturers to register and pay VAT
irrespective of turnover.
31 As mentioned earlier, the second small scale census and the survey in 1999-
2000 estimate the average ratio of value addition to value of output at 35 percent
for this sector.